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An Anti-Integrated Bar Misrepresentation Exploded
Much publicity has been given in the past two years to a story
relayed concerning a lawyer in an integrated bar state, who was re-
ported to have lost a $4,500.00 fee because he failed to pay his annual
$2.00 consolidated bar assessment. The facts seem to be that the fee
was charged for collecting on insurance policies in an uncontested mat-
ter; one policy being paid within 17 days and the other within thirty
days from proof of claim. A jury had found there was no express
contract for the lawyer's compensation. The judgment was affirmed on
appeal. The lawyer then sued on a quantum meruit and the court,
without a jury, awarded him a judgment for $4,500.00. The bene-
ficiary appealed, and the lawyer was not allowed to recover, because
of failure to pay his $2.00 annual registration fee; imposed by an Act
passed in 1921. The humor of the argument against bar integration,
based on this incident, is that the services for which this large judg-
ment was rendered, were performed, and the $2.00 fee was assessed,
two years before there was any Integrated Bar in that state. The story
is valuable, as showing to what lengths the adversaries of integration
will go, in their efforts to bring the program into disrepute. (On
this, case see Journal of American Judicature Society, Vol. 22, No. 1,
p. 21: issue of June, 1938; and Vol. 19, p. 185, issue of April, 1936.)
DEATHS
Charles J. Ryan, aged 63, Fort Wayne. Judge of Allen Superior
Court, No. 1; didd July 11, 1938.
Ora D. Davis, aged 68, Terre Haute, Indiana. Died June 13,
1938.
Harlan A. Stauffer, aged 62, Lafayette, Indiana. Died May 31,
1938.
Winslow S. Pierce, aged 81, formerly of Indianapolis. Died July
23, 1938.
RECENT CASE NOTES
PARTNERSHIP-POWER OF LIQUIDATING PARTNER To BIND THE PARTNERSHIP.-
Suit by receiver of a bank against the estate of one Betts upon two notes
executed after the death of Betts by the surviving partners of the firm of
which he had been a member at the time of his decease. The notes were
made to evidence a loan of funds which were borrowed for the purpose of
being used and were actually used in completing the performance of a con-
struction contract with a railroad company. Although the written contract with
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the railroad company was not executed until after the death of Betts, yet prior
to Betts' death the firm had submitted a bid, and had so conducted itself as to
give reasonable inference of its acceptance of the counter offer thereupon made
by the railroad company. Since the two surviving partners have become bank-
rupt, the receiver attempted to collect from the deceased partner's estate.
Held: the actual contract of construction was made before the dissolution of
the partnership and the making of the loan was incidental to winding up the
affairs of the partnership; and therefore, the estate of Betts is liable on the
note.1
Upon the death of a partner, the partnership is dissolved by operation of
law, without any notice or judicial decree.2 The legal title to all the partner-
ship personalty immediately passes to the surviving partner or partners, it
being held in trust for the purpose of and in the performance of their duty
of liquidating the firm's assets.3  Since the average business firm cannot
immediately stop operations, turn all its assets into cash, and close up, the
liquidating partner or partners must have a reasonable time in which to wind
up the affairs.
As is generally known, during the regular operation of the firm each partner
has implied authority to act as agent to bind the firm in any matter within the
scope of the partnership business. However, after dissolution effected by the
death of one of the members this implied authority is limited to winding up
the affairs of the firm. The rule had been stated that whatever a partner,
as survivor or liquidator, does that is reasonably necessary to the completion
of the firm's existing obligations is within the scope of his authority.4 But
when the application of this general rule defining the agency is studied, one
finds that courts of various jurisdictions have in many cases reached opposite
results.
Most courts hold that one partner can nowhere create new obligations
or enter into new business so as to bind the other members of the dissolved
firm and continue the winding up indefinitely.5 They agree, also, that where
a partnership is a party to an executory contract, the death of a partner does
not terminate the contract, nor relieve its members of the duty of performing
1 Feucht v. Corbett (Indiana, 1938), 12 N. E. (2d) 957. The question of
whether or not a good contract with a valid offer and acceptance existed prior
to the death of the decedent is a very close one. However, the court seems to
be correct in concluaing that the written instrument was but a memorial of
the contract instead of a condition precedent thereto. The Appellate Court
in Evan v. Citizen Loan & Trust Co. (1932), 94 Ind. App. 161, 180 N. E. 23,
held on the same construction contract, that no valid contract was consummated
prior to the dissolution. At least for the purposes of this note the validity
of the court's argument is conceded.
2 It has been said- that by agreement the members can provide for carrying
on after the death of one of the partners, but technically this is actually a
new partnership, assuming the obligations and assets of the old one.
3Mechem on Partnership, Section 402; also, see Barry v. Briggs (1871),
22 Mich. 201. A surviving partner stands in the same relation to the part-
nership property as an administrator or trustee to his trust; Harrah v. State
(1906), 38 Ind. App. 495, 76 N. E. 44-3.4 King v. Leighton (1885), 100 N. Y. 386, 3 N. E. 594; Little v. Caldwell
(1894), 101 Cal. 553, 36 P. 107; Gilm6re on Partnership, Sec. 118.
5 Boss Co. v. Granite City Co. (1902), 116 Ga. 176, 42 S. E. 415; Maryland
Casualty Co. v. Little (1930), 102 Cal. 205, 282 P. 968.
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the unfulfilled contract, except in the case of contracts which call for the
personal skill and efforts of the deceased partner.6 Among the other powers
conceded to the liquidating partner are the power to sell firm goods, 7 collect
the credits,8 and pay firm debts. 9 But when the liquidating partner has bor-
rowed money, even to be used in paying the firm debts, the authorities are
in direct conflict. One of the leading cases on this problem is the English
case of Butchart v. Dresser,10 in which the liquidating partner borrowed
money and pledged shares of stock as security, in order to have funds to
enable him to fulfill a contract made prior to dissolution. The English
Court of Appeals held that this was within the power of the liquidating
partner and bound the firm members. In the United States, the New York
court in Durant v. Pierson,1 1 after admitting the general rule that there is
no power or authority in the surviving partners to engage in new transactions,
contracts or liabilities on account of the firm, said, "When a partnership is
dissolved by death of a partner, the survivor is entitled to the possession and
control of the joint property for the purpose of closing its business, and to
that end and for that purpose he may, according to the settled principles
of partnership law, administer the affairs of the firm, and by sale, mortgage
or other reasonable disposition of the property make provision for meeting
its obligations. He may, for that purpose, borrow money, and give a valid
pledge of the co-partnership property for its repayment."1 2
However, contrary to the view of the Butchart and Durant cases are the
many cases holding that a firm note cannot be given by the liquidating part-
ner, even in renewal; or negotiable paper endorsed, even to pay existing
obligations.13 The theory underlying this rule is that since the dissolution
operates as a revocation of all authority for making new contracts and since
the giving of a promissory note or the acceptance of a bill or draft is the
making of a new contract, although it may be for an antecedent debt, the
creation of such new obligations is beyond the power of the liquidating
partner.14
In the instant case, even if it be conceded that the construction contract
was made prior to dissolution, the Indiana Supreme Court, in applying the
GKimmell v. State (1920), 75 Ind. App. 168, 128 N. E. 708, Weiss v.
Hamilton (1909), 40 Mont. 99, 105 P. 74; Stem v. Warren (1916), 161
N. Y. S. 247.
7Robbins v. Fuller (1862), 24 N. Y. 570.
8 Gillilar v. Sun Ins. Co. (1869), 41 N. Y. 376.
9 Milliken v. Loring (1854), 37 Me. 408.
10 (1853), 43 Engl. Repr. 619.
11 (1903), 124 N. Y. 44, 26 N. E. 1095. Also, see Rowley on Modern Law
of Partnership, Sec. 618.
12 Also, supporting this view, State Bank of Wheatland v. Bagley Bros.
(1932), 44 Wyo. 307, 11 P. (2d) 592; Rosenthal v. Hasberg "(1903), 84 N. Y. S.
290. In Stenback v. Smith (1917), 34 Cal. App. 223, 167 P. 189, the court
said it would be no different for same amount due, but only a different person.
13Hamilton v. Seaman (1848), 1 Ind. 185; Conklin v. Ogborn (1856),
7 Ind. 553; Heide v. Beuttler (1935), 11 F. Supp. 290; Simpson v. Shadwell
(1932), 264 11. App. 480. Also, see Wood v. Todd (1918), 251 F. 530-
admitting this to be the rule except when the law of a state differs, and that
Pennsylvania gives liquidating partner authority to execute notes in renewal
of obligations made before dissolution.
14 Bank'of Montreal v. Page (1881), 98 Il1. 109.
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rule that the liquidating partner may borrow in the firm name and use firm
property as security for such purposes, as an exception to the general rule
that a surviving partner cannot borrow money and bind the partnership
after dissolution, appears to be making an inroad upon the prior rulings in
Indiana on this subject.1 5  I. K.
TRUSTS-BANKS AND BANKING-SET-OFFS AGAINST TRuSr FuND.-Appellee
Tractor Company delivered a tractor to an Equipment Company, an inde-
pendent sales agency, under a conditional sales contract, the Equipment Com-
pany executing its note for the wholesale price and assigning the purchase
order of its customer and all moneys due thereunder to appellee. The cus-
tomer, through its treasurer, issued a warrant to the Equipment Company, who
indorsed it and deposited it in appellant bank to credit its checking account.
The Equipment Company was indebted to the bank on an overdue note, and
appellant credited a part of the deposit to its overdue note. Upon suit by
appellee for the amount applied to the note, recovery was allowed, and appeal
taken. Held, affirmed. The bank, not having changed position in reliance
on the buyer's apparent title, nor having given value, could not set off the
buyer's pre-existing debt to the bank against a deposit to defeat the condi-
tional seller's claim to the deposit. A bank may not appropriate funds
deposited by a trustee in his own name to payment of a personal pre-existing
debt of the trustee, even if the bank had no knowledge of the true owner's
interest at the time of appropriation of the funds.1
There is no doubt that where no other right is involved, money deposited
in a bank creates the relation of debtor and creditor between the bank and
the depositor, the money becoming the property of the bank, and the bank
having the right to apply a sufficient amount of the deposit to the payment
of any debt due from the depositor to the bank.2 At the other extreme, there
is no doubt that where the bank knows a third person has an interest in a
deposit made in another individual's name, the bank is precluded from apply-
ing those funds to the depositor's indebtedness to the bank.3 However,
between these two extremes is an intermediate step in which trust funds are
deposited to the trustee's personal account and the bank, not knowing they
are trust funds, attempts to apply them to the depositor's indebtedness to the
bank.
On this last point, there is a great'split of authority, and there has been
a further split by distinguishing between cases where the depositor's consent
15 Hamilton v. Seamon (1848), 1 Ind. 185; Conklin v. Ogborn (1856), 7
Ind. 553. Also, see Hayden v. Cretcher (1881), 75 Ind. 108.
'Peoples State Bank v. Caterpillar Tractor Co. (1938, Ind.), 12 N. E.
(2d) 123.2 Bedford Bank v. Acoam (1890), 125 Ind. 584, 25 N. E. 713; Lamb,
Receiver, v. Morris (1888), 118 Ind. 179, 20 N. E. 746; Second National Bank
v. Hill (1881), 76 Ind. 223, 40 A. R. 239; Aurora National Bank v. Dils
(1897), 18 Ind. App. 319, 48 N. E. 19.
3 Shepard v. Meridian National Bank (1897), 149 Ind. 532, 48 N. E. 346;
Bundy v. Town of Monticello (1882), 84 Ind. 119; Davis v. Indiana National
Bank (1920), 73 Ind. App. 563, 126 N. E. 489; Miami County Bank v. State
(1915), 61 Ind. App. 360, 112 N. E. 40; Martin v. First National Bank (1931),
51 F. (2d) 840.
